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Reflections on the Impact and Importance of International and Global Education
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Musings on Japanese and Ryukyu Budo
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Reflections on the Impact and Importance of International and Global Education
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Musings on Japanese and Ryukyu Budo
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Myth, Projection, and the Sign of Elsewhere:Sartre, Derrida, and Why Araby Is the Antidote to Africa24/2/2026 There are works one loves before one interrogates. Toto’s Africa is one of them. Its harmonic architecture is luminous; its tonal sincerity disarming. The song produces affective elevation with remarkable efficiency. It feels expansive, romantic, almost sacred. And yet, from within a semiotic and existential framework, something far more complex is taking place. The word “Africa” in the song does not function as a referent. It does not signify 54 nations, layered colonial histories, languages, cities, infrastructures, politics. Instead, it operates as a mythic signifier — detached from referential density and reattached to longing, redemption, authenticity and spiritual restoration. In Barthesian terms, it becomes myth. But through a Sartrean lens, something sharper emerges: projection. For Sartre, consciousness is intentional — it is always consciousness of something. Yet it is also constitutively lacking. Desire arises from absence. We project meaning outward in order to stabilise ourselves. The beloved, the nation, the “elsewhere” becomes charged with transcendence not because it possesses it, but because consciousness requires it. In Africa, the continent functions precisely as such a projection surface. The singer seeks to “cure what’s deep inside.” Africa becomes the imagined site of plenitude. It is not encountered; it is posited. It is an object for-for-itself — shaped by the needs of the subject. The problem is not malice; it is bad faith. The song does not acknowledge the act of projection. It treats its myth as presence. Now consider Joyce’s Araby. The boy invests the word “Araby” with erotic and spiritual promise. The bazaar becomes an object of transcendence. It gleams in his imagination as a realm beyond the greyness of Dublin paralysis. Like Toto’s “Africa,” it is less a place than a promise. But Joyce stages the collapse of this projection. When the boy arrives, the bazaar is tawdry, commercial, dimly lit. The epiphany — “Gazing up into the darkness I saw myself as a creature driven and derided by vanity” — is existential recognition. He confronts his own act of meaning-making. He sees that the transcendence he sought was his own fabrication. Where Toto sustains myth, Joyce dismantles it. If Sartre explains the mechanism of projection, Derrida complicates the structure further. For Derrida, the sign never delivers full presence. Meaning is always deferred — différance — structured by absence as much as presence. The sign “Africa” in the song appears full, radiant, stable. But its meaning depends precisely on what it excludes: historical specificity, political complexity, African voices themselves. The fullness is constructed through erasure. The song relies on what Derrida would call the metaphysics of presence — the illusion that the sign transparently delivers what it names. “Africa” sounds as if it stands before us, rain-soaked and sublime. Yet its meaning is constituted by a chain of substitutions: documentary images, inherited myths, romantic tropes, Western longings. It is a sign without stable referent — a floating signifier animated by desire. Joyce, by contrast, exposes différance at work. “Araby” promises presence but delivers deferral. The boy’s disillusionment is not merely emotional; it is structural. The sign fails to stabilise meaning. The exotic dissolves into commercial banality. The centre does not hold. Thus, within a Sartrean–Derridean frame:
This is the tension modern culture often inhabits: aesthetic depth alongside conceptual shallowness. To call the song “silly” is not entirely unfair. Its geographical collapses — Kilimanjaro rising like Olympus above the Serengeti — reveal a semiotic indifference to precision. But its sincerity prevents it from descending into parody. It is not cynical exploitation; it is romantic abstraction. Joyce, however, makes the silliness the point. In that sense, Araby functions as antidote to Africa. It teaches us to recognise when we have mistaken projection for presence, myth for geography, longing for knowledge. One sings within myth. The other recognises its construction. Perhaps maturity lies not in rejecting the song, but in hearing it with awareness — enjoying its sonic architecture while recognising its semiotic structure. To hold enchantment and critique together is not contradiction; it is intellectual responsibility. Sartre reminds us that we project meaning outward. Derrida reminds us that meaning never fully arrives. Joyce reminds us to notice when we have been seduced by our own signs. And Toto, quite unintentionally, gives us a beautiful example of why such reminders remain necessary. トトの「Africa」は音楽的には美しく、ロマンティックで誠実な響きを持つ。しかし記号論的・哲学的に見ると、「Africa」は具体的な大陸を指すのではなく、憧れや救済への欲望を投影する〈神話的記号〉として機能している。サルトル的に言えば、それは欠如を抱えた主体が外部へ意味を投射する行為であり、自己の欲望を他者に託す構造である。 一方、ジョイスの「Araby」も同様に〈東洋〉を幻想化するが、物語はその幻想を崩壊させる。少年は、自らの投影と虚栄を悟る。デリダ的に言えば、記号は決して完全な現前を与えず、意味はつねに遅延されることが露わになる。 つまり「Africa」は神話を持続させ、「Araby」は神話を解体する。前者は投影の中で歌い、後者は投影に気づく。その差異こそが、両者を分かつ核心である。
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It has taken just over two years for my professional qualifications and experience to be formally recognised within the Irish education system. The process has involved registration with the Teaching Council of Ireland, completion of Droichead, and the ongoing review of incremental credit. On paper, this is administrative progression. In practice, it offers a revealing case study in how professional subjects are produced within regulatory systems. Ireland frequently describes its education system as internationally minded, outward-looking, and globally engaged. These claims are not unfounded. Irish schools participate in Erasmus exchanges, international curricula, and transnational partnerships. Yet internationalism at the level of rhetoric does not automatically translate into permeability at the level of professional recognition. This is not an accusation. It is an observation about structure. Droichead does not assess biography. It standardises entry. It ensures that every teacher — whether newly graduated or internationally experienced — passes through the same regulatory gate. In Foucauldian terms, it functions as a technology of governmentality: a mechanism through which professional subjects are rendered legible, comparable, and governable. The category “Newly Qualified Teacher” is therefore less a description than a production. It positions the returning educator within a classificatory grid that temporarily suspends accumulated experience. Thirty years in international leadership can coexist, administratively, with the label “new.” From a Bourdieusian perspective, the explanation lies in the field's structure. Professional capital only circulates when it is recognised within that field’s symbolic economy. Qualifications, networks, and institutional affiliations derive their value from local legitimacy. Capital accumulated abroad is not erased — it is untranslated. In larger systems, prestige diffuses. In smaller systems, it concentrates. Certain pathways operate as condensed signals of authority. Recognition is relational, not universal. The field protects its coherence through bounded forms of capital. None of this is uniquely Irish. Modern professional systems depend upon classification. Salary scales, incremental credit procedures, and induction frameworks are technologies of order. They convert complex biographies into administratively comparable units. They stabilise standards and protect internal equity. Yet there remains a productive tension. An education system that celebrates international engagement must also confront the question of how portable professional capital truly is. If international-mindedness is a substantive value rather than a rhetorical aspiration, it must extend beyond student exchange and curricular discourse to include structural openness to professional mobility. The experience of moving through induction after decades in education was not diminishing. It was clarifying. It revealed that professional identity is not a possession that can be carried intact across borders. It is conferred within specific regimes of recognition. Completion of Droichead marks the end of one classificatory moment. The incremental credit process continues. But the deeper insight lies elsewhere: legitimacy in compact systems is produced through translation, not assertion. The task, therefore, is not resistance but fluency. To understand the field’s symbolic economy. To allow capital to convert gradually through contributions. To recognise that governance and recognition are intertwined. Internationalism, if it is to be more than a slogan, requires not only outward-facing aspiration but inward-facing reflexivity. It requires systems to examine how their own classification practices shape the mobility of returning individuals. Professional identity is always relational. Recognition is always produced. And the most durable authority is rarely the one most loudly signalled. Extension: Internationalism and Structural Legibility. Ireland frequently articulates a commitment to international-mindedness. Policy frameworks reference global citizenship, mobility, exchange, and outward engagement. Schools participate in partnerships and programmes that signal openness to the wider world. Yet from a Foucauldian perspective, one further question presents itself: what function does this discourse perform within the regime of professional truth itself? Internationalism can operate as symbolic capital — a marker of modernity and cosmopolitan orientation — without necessarily altering the classificatory mechanisms through which professional legitimacy is authorised. In such cases, the language of openness coexists with recognition structures that remain nationally bounded. This is not a contradiction so much as structural inertia. Regimes of truth tend to stabilise themselves. They absorb progressive discourse while maintaining the regulatory apparatus that ensures coherence and comparability. International-mindedness may flourish in curricular rhetoric while professional mobility continues to require extended translation into locally intelligible forms. The more generative question, then, is not whether a system is inward-looking, but whether its mechanisms of recognition evolve alongside its global aspirations. If international engagement is to be more than an educational ideal for students, it must also become structurally legible for educators. Otherwise, internationalism risks functioning primarily as discourse rather than transformation. 🇯🇵 日本語による要約(Short Summary in Japanese)本稿は、海外で長年教育に携わった後にアイルランドへ帰国し、資格認定および正式な職業的地位を得るまでに要した二年間の経験を振り返るものである。 その過程(登録、Droicheadの修了、給与段階の審査)は単なる事務手続きではなく、専門職としての「主体」がどのように制度の中で再構築されるかを示す一例であった。 フーコーの「真理の体制(regime of truth)」の概念に基づけば、専門性は単に経験によって成立するのではなく、制度によって「承認される」ことによって成立する。 またブルデューの理論を援用すれば、専門的資本(cultural capital)は、それが属するフィールドにおいて認識されて初めて有効となる。 アイルランドの教育制度は国際志向を掲げているが、専門職の認定構造がどこまで国際的経験を構造的に受け入れているのかは、再考の余地がある。 本稿は批判ではなく、制度の自己省察を促す問いである。 専門的正統性は持ち運ばれるものではなく、制度の中で再び生産されるものである、という理解に至った。 Examinations do not simply assess knowledge; they organise it. The room is spare. A table. Three chairs. No syllabus. No marking scheme. Only a question that has been quietly accompanying me since I returned to teaching Higher Level Leaving Certificate English, after many years working within the IB Literature framework. Two figures arrive first. One attends closely to systems — to procedures, classifications, and the quiet authority exercised by practices that present themselves as neutral. The other watches more obliquely, attentive to posture, ease, vocabulary — to what people take for granted when they feel they belong. They invite me to speak. Foucault You have described a sense of dissonance since returning to this system. What do you take that dissonance to be? Me At first, I assumed it was a question of difficulty — that one curriculum demanded more than the other. That explanation no longer holds. What I am encountering is not a difference in standards but a difference in orientation. In the Leaving Certificate, literary knowledge appears as something to be demonstrated: clearly, coherently, under carefully standardised conditions. In the IB, it appeared more often as something to be constructed: provisionally, dialogically, across time and modes. Foucault So you are not describing two examinations, but two ways in which knowledge is rendered intelligible. Me Yes. Assessment does not merely register learning; it shapes the conditions under which particular forms of understanding become visible, credible, and worth performing. This becomes especially apparent under examination conditions, where patterns of choice tend to align with familiarity and recognisability — not as a failure of ambition, but as a rational response to the epistemic logic of the system itself. Bourdieu(interrupting) You are describing competence within a field. Me Exactly. Within a highly standardised, terminal assessment structure, caution functions as a form of intelligence. Choosing what is familiar is not an abdication of thought; it is an alignment with what is most likely to be recognised as legitimate. Seen in this way, student behaviour reads less as resistance to challenge and more as fluency in the rules of the game. Bourdieu And your own response? Me I have come to see it as the product of a different professional formation. My pedagogical instincts were shaped in a field where interpretive risk is normalised, where uncertainty is not penalised but worked through, and where authority accrues through sustained engagement rather than singular performance. What initially registered as hesitation now reads as precision — calibrated to a different set of expectations. Foucault You have mentioned the structure of the Leaving Certificate papers. Why does that matter? Me Because structure teaches quietly. Paper 1 privileges language — rhetoric, creativity, the critical reading of unseen texts. Paper 2 consolidates literature into a single, summative space. That division does not diminish literary study, but it does delimit it. It suggests where interpretation properly belongs, and under what conditions it should appear. Such design choices are never neutral; they shape how a subject is understood and inhabited. Foucault And yet, you resist critique. Me Because critique presumes a hierarchy I no longer find helpful, a national system assessing tens of thousands of candidates must prioritise equity, reliability, and standardisation. Those priorities inevitably carry epistemological consequences. What unsettled me was not deficiency, but difference — and the way that difference rendered my own assumptions newly visible. Bourdieu So what, then, are you learning? Me Translation. How to articulate deep literary engagement within an assessment culture that values clarity, containment, and demonstrability — without abandoning intellectual seriousness. It has sharpened my attention to how confidence is produced, how risk is rationed, and how students, often tacitly, learn what kinds of thinking are worth performing. They leave. The question remains. At what point does an assessment stop measuring knowledge and begin producing it? After six months teaching Leaving Certificate English, I find myself less interested in comparisons of rigour and more attentive to the kinds of knowers different systems invite students to become. English, in this sense, is never simply about texts. It is about the conditions under which interpretation is allowed to appear — and to count. 本稿は、アイルランドのリービング・サーティフィケート英語(上級)を6か月間教えた経験を、IB文学教育の背景から省察的に捉えた思考実験である。フーコーとブルデューとの架空の対話という形式を用い、試験が単に学習を測定する装置ではなく、「何が知識として可視化され、正当と認められるか」を構成する制度であることを示す。リービング・サーティフィケートでは、文学的知識は標準化された条件下で「示される」ものとして位置づけられ、IBでは対話的・暫定的に「構築される」傾向が強い。この違いは難易度ではなく認識論的方向性の差である。試験下で学生が慣れ親しんだ素材を選ぶ行為は、挑戦回避ではなく、その制度における合理的な熟達として理解されるべきだと論じる。最終的に、本稿は英語教育を「テクスト」ではなく、「解釈が現れ、価値を持つ条件」をめぐる営みとして捉え直す。 Author’s note: This piece is exploratory rather than declarative. It records a line of thought encountered in the early hours of the morning and follows it deliberately, not because it is settled, but because it is clarifying. No position is advanced here as final. The purpose is to test ideas under pressure, not to displace belief, ridicule faith, or offer moral verdicts. I do not lose sleep from anxiety so much as from unresolved explanations. Some nights, two accounts of the world refuse to yield to one another, each internally coherent, each ethically troubling. My mind does not race; it circles. The irritation lies not in confusion, but in clarity arriving in incompatible forms. Years of practice in Asian martial traditions trained me to live more comfortably with unresolved tension. In budō, what looks stable is often precarious; what appears decisive is frequently compensatory. Western habits of thought, by contrast, tend to demand resolution: a position taken, a conclusion reached, a winner declared. These habits still coexist uncomfortably within me. Some questions, I have learned, deteriorate when forced towards premature closure. They require pressure, not verdicts. What follows is not an attempt to reconcile competing explanations, but to test what each demands of us when taken seriously. Two such explanations have been taking turns in my head. The first is familiar, even reassuring. It places humanity at the centre of a purposeful moral universe: created with intent, bound by obligation, and redeemed through sacrifice. Within this framework, moral categories are ontologically real. Sin is a deviation from an intended order. Suffering, though often opaque, is meaningful. Worship is not optional; it is owed. The second explanation removes that centre entirely. The universe is indifferent, not hostile; unplanned, not malicious. Humanity appears not as fallen but as contingent — a life-form ecologically successful, technologically dominant, and historically disruptive. Moral categories exist, but they are constructed rather than given. There is no inherited debt, no cosmic narrative arc, and no guarantee that intelligence carries moral privilege. Neither of these accounts is trivial. Neither is morally innocent. The discomfort arises because each resolves certain ethical problems only by generating others that are more disturbing. A godless universe removes consolation. A god-governed universe risks normalising submission. It is this mutual exposure — rather than belief versus disbelief — that has proven difficult to set aside. What follows should be read not as a rejection of belief, but as an internal pressure-test applied to its moral architecture. Within Christian theology, redemption is presented as an act of mercy. Yet the moral unease persists. If the conditions for sin are authored by the same deity who demands restitution, then salvation appears less as rescue than as repair within a closed moral system. The language of grace reframes the difficulty, but does not entirely dissolve it. Dying for humanity’s sins carries a different moral texture if those sins are inseparable from the system in which humanity was placed. The problem here is not the sincerity of belief. It is structural. The question is whether the framework can bear the moral weight placed upon it without relying on deference as a substitute for justification. When worship becomes a requirement rather than a response, moral clarity begins to blur. The alternative framework — ecological rather than theological — offers no such consolations. It suggests a less flattering possibility: that humanity’s destructiveness is not a moral anomaly but a biological outcome. That we may function less as stewards and more as an invasive species, misaligned with the systems upon which we depend. This is not a claim I advance as truth. It is a thought experiment — and a deliberately counter-intuitive one. Like all metaphors, it clarifies certain features while distorting others; its usefulness lies in what it exposes, not in its completeness. What if humanity has not fallen, but simply misaligned? What if our capacity for damage reflects ecological success without restraint rather than moral failure? This possibility does not explain human care, sacrifice, or restraint particularly well, which is precisely why it is worth considering alongside, rather than instead of, more familiar moral narratives. What makes the thought experiment unsettling is not that it removes moral responsibility, but that it removes moral entitlement. It strips away the assumption that we are owed redemption, purpose, or cosmic significance. It leaves us answerable, but not special. This is often where objections arise. Surely such a view collapses into nihilism? Surely ethics cannot survive the removal of divine grounding? Yet this reaction may reveal more about our reliance on moral guarantees than about the argument itself. Ethics without metaphysical applause is not weaker; it is heavier. It demands restraint without reward, care without promise, and judgment without absolution — and offers no one the comfort of innocence. As a teacher, I often tell students that understanding requires more than defending what one believes. It requires engaging seriously with the possibility that one’s position, examined from another angle, may be wrong — or even morally compromised. Ideas that cannot survive exposure to their strongest opposites are rarely understood; they are merely protected. This applies as much to secular humanism as it does to theology. A humanism that cannot imagine humanity as a destructive risk becomes sentimental. A faith that cannot tolerate suspicion risks becoming coercive. Both fail in different ways when they insist on immunity from critique. Budō does not reward forcing resolution where none exists. Balance is not a static achievement but a continuous negotiation. The aim is not to strike prematurely, but to remain attentive. Western intellectual habits still push me towards conclusions; practice reminds me that posture often matters more. I do not offer these reflections to resolve belief against disbelief, nor to replace one certainty with another. I offer them because ideas that matter should withstand sustained attention — including attention that is sceptical, inconvenient, and slow. The most dangerous beliefs are not those that are challenged, but those that are never pressed hard enough to reveal their cost. These questions keep me awake not because they confuse me, but because they refuse to settle into comfort. To refuse easy consolation is not to deny meaning, but to insist that meaning earn its authority. 本稿は、夜眠れないほど頭から離れなかった二つの世界観の緊張関係を、そのまま思考実験として記録したものである。一つは、人間を目的をもって創造された特別な存在とみなし、罪と救済、意味と崇拝を前提とする神中心の世界観である。もう一つは、宇宙を本質的に無関心なものと捉え、人間を偶然的で生態学的に成功した生命体の一つと見る立場である。後者では、人間の破壊性は道徳的堕落ではなく、制御を欠いた適応の結果として理解される。本稿はどちらかを結論づけることを目的とせず、それぞれを真剣に押し広げたときに何が要求され、何が不安定になるのかを検討する。武道の修練が教えるように、安易な決着はしばしば理解を損なう。重要なのは、快い答えを急ぐことではなく、不都合な問いから目を逸らさずに留まり続ける姿勢である。 At first glance, a budō organisation and a school appear to have little in common. One trains bodies through disciplined movement and tradition; the other trains minds through curriculum, assessment, and institutional structures. Yet both are fundamentally educational organisations. Both depend on transmission, authority, trust, and culture. And both face the same quiet risk: mistaking longevity for coherence, and tradition for organisational health. Whether on the mat or in the classroom, the central question is the same: How do we sustain values, standards, and identity across generations without freezing them in place? 1. Longevity Is Not the Same as Transmission In budō, extended membership is often taken as evidence of depth. In schools, long service is often treated as a source of authority. But staying is not the same as transmitting well. Accurate transmission — of technique, ethos, or professional standards — requires clarity. Students, practitioners, and colleagues must be able to answer:
2. Tradition Without Reflection Becomes Stagnation Budō philosophy is explicit: kata without understanding is empty. Education research echoes this: routine without reflection produces compliance, not learning. When practices are defended with “this is how we’ve always done it,” reflection has already stopped. In both schools and martial arts organisations, stagnation begins not because tradition exists, but because it is no longer interrogated. Healthy organisations treat tradition as a living inheritance. They ask:
3. Disagreement Is a Health Signal, Not a Threat A key indicator of organisational health is how disagreement is handled. In unhealthy cultures, disagreement is personalised. Seniority becomes protection. Questions are read as challenges to status rather than contributions to learning. In healthy budō organisations and schools alike, explicit norms exist for disagreement. Members know:
4. Coherence Matters More Than Geography In budō, moving between dōjō or organisations can attract suspicion. In education, mobility is sometimes framed as instability. Yet neither staying nor moving determines quality. Coherence does. A practitioner or teacher who moves but integrates learning thoughtfully strengthens the organisation. One who stays but reflects deeply does the same. Problems arise only when movement becomes superficial or staying becomes defensive. Healthy organisations establish shared core values while allowing local interpretation. Alignment between values, training, evaluation, and leadership practice — not tenure — sustains culture. 5. Leadership Is Modelling, Not Position Culture is reinforced through what is rewarded, tolerated, and modelled. Students and junior practitioners learn less from mission statements than from daily signals:
6. Belonging Without Blindness Strong organisations foster belonging — but not at the expense of thought. Belonging means people feel:
In schools, it enables professional dialogue rather than compliance. When people feel safe to question and refine practice, loyalty becomes earned, not enforced. Culture becomes a guide, not a constraint. In Closing Staying does not equal greatness. Moving does not equal shallowness. In budō organisations and schools alike, organisational health depends on coherence:
But because it is understood, tested, and renewed. That is true transmission — in the dojo and in the classroom. 本稿は、学校と武道組織に共通する「組織的な一貫性(コヒーレンス)」と健全性について論じるものである。長く一つの組織に属していることは、必ずしも優れた実践や深い理解を意味しない。同様に、複数の組織を移動してきた経験も、それ自体が専門性を保証するものではない。重要なのは、価値観や期待される行動が明確に共有され、伝統が無批判に守られるのではなく、内省と対話を通して更新されているかどうかである。健全な組織文化は、明確な規範、建設的な異議申し立ての在り方、そして立場ではなく行動によって示されるリーダーシップによって支えられる。真の伝承とは、変化を拒むことではなく、理解と熟慮をもって伝統を生かし続けることである。 |
James M. HatchInternational Educator who happens to be passionate about Chito Ryu Karate. Born in Ireland, educated in Canada, matured in Japan Archives
April 2026
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