The Poison and the Path: Martial Arts, Religion, and the Ethics of Comparison

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Morgan, K. (2020). Martial Arts, Religion and Ressentiment. Presentation to the 6th Martial Arts Studies Conference, Martial Arts, Religion and Spirituality, July 2020.

Ressentiment and the Martial Arts: Towards a More Fraternal Discourse?An academic review of Kai Morgan’s “Martial Arts, Religion and Ressentiment” (2020).

In her 2020 conference paper Martial Arts, Religion and Ressentiment, Kai Morgan delivers a timely and philosophically informed analysis of a long-familiar pathology within martial arts culture: the persistent rivalries, dismissiveness, and tribalism that can define inter-style relations. Drawing on the philosophical tradition of ressentiment—primarily through Nietzsche, Scheler, and more recently, Tomelleri—Morgan reframes martial rivalries not merely as personality clashes or ideological disagreements, but as deeper, affectively charged expressions of perceived inferiority and inverted values.

Morgan’s paper contributes meaningfully to the maturing field of martial arts studies, particularly the branch that engages with critical theory and philosophy. Rather than focusing on technical efficacy or lineage histories, she explores how martial practice becomes entangled in social psychology, institutional hierarchies, and the ethics of recognition. In doing so, her work stands alongside scholars like Sixt Wetzler and Paul Bowman in framing martial arts not just as embodied disciplines, but as ideologically saturated and ethically contested cultural fields.

Her argument begins with a compelling analogy: just as religious denominations may seek similar ends but fall into mutual mistrust, martial artists often profess to pursue self-mastery, discipline, and growth—yet remain mired in suspicion and critique of others. As Morgan notes, “It’s a very common topic of conversation to say that such and such style is severely flawed and/or would never work on ‘the street.’” This dismissiveness, she argues, stems not only from insecurity but also from a deeper emotional structure: ressentiment.

Drawing from Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), Morgan defines ressentiment as a toxic inversion of values—wherein individuals or groups, unable to match others in strength or success, recast their own weakness as moral superiority. In Nietzsche’s words, this is the “transvaluation of values”—a process whereby “worldly power, wealth and success are seen as ‘bad,’ while meekness, humility and poverty are seen as ‘good.’” Morgan maps this neatly onto martial arts culture: a struggling school may denounce a more successful one as a “McDojo,” regardless of technical quality, thus claiming the moral high ground through critique rather than self-improvement.

Crucially, Morgan distinguishes between valid critique and ressentiment. It is not inherently wrong to criticise poor-quality instruction or commercial excess. The line is crossed, she argues, when “you’re jealous of their financial success, and telling yourself that their focus on money is immoral,” without any objective basis for judgement. This, she notes, is “ressentiment at work.”

Her paper offers several sharp examples. The “keyboard warrior” who lacks practical experience but issues withering critiques online; the teacher who eschews sparring and instead elevates esoteric energy work; or the practitioner who disdains MMA as “brutish,” yet has never stepped into a ring. In each case, ressentiment emerges not from philosophical difference, but from a defensive reframing of inadequacy.

Building on this analysis, Morgan brings in Max Scheler’s critique of Nietzsche. Writing in the early 20th century, Scheler rejects Nietzsche’s claim that Christianity causes ressentiment, instead locating the problem in the dissonance between modernity’s promise of equality and the ongoing reality of economic and social inequality. In Scheler’s view, societies with rigid hierarchies or actual equality suffer less from ressentiment; it festers most where aspiration and opportunity are out of sync. Morgan deftly applies this to martial arts dojos as “mini-societies”—structured but porous, often offering the illusion of empowerment without its lived reality. A black belt may feel powerful within their own gym, yet inadequate in the broader world, or threatened by rival instructors. Here, martial rank masks insecurity, and rivalry becomes psychological compensation.

Yet Morgan’s argument does not end in cynicism. Indeed, the most refreshing turn in her paper lies in her turn to Stefano Tomelleri’s reinterpretation of ressentiment as potentially transformative. For Tomelleri, ressentiment is not the province of the “morally weak,” as Nietzsche would have it, but a universal and even necessary experience. When acknowledged honestly, it can push individuals toward “growth, justice and transformation.” As Morgan writes, “Ressentiment… instead of poisoning the soul becomes the soul’s salvation.”

This transformative vision is rooted in Tomelleri’s concept of fraternity—not as benevolence, but as a mutual commitment to shared vulnerability and dialogue. Morgan aligns this with Ben Spatz’s notion of martial arts practice as a form of research, particularly one in which our training partners are also our rivals. The Japanese term aite (相手), meaning both “opponent” and “partner,” captures this tension beautifully. The dojo, then, becomes a site for ethical inquiry, where practitioners face both their technical limits and their emotional reactivity.

To conclude, Morgan introduces Steven G. Smith’s “bowl climbing” metaphor—a direct challenge to the tired trope of all martial arts being “different paths up the same mountain.” Smith suggests that in both religion and martial arts, we often appear to be asking the same questions, while actually seeking fundamentally different ends. Therefore, meaningful dialogue requires not consensus, but “shared seriousness about seeking what is worthiest to be sought.” This, Morgan argues, is a more honest and productive foundation for inter-style engagement.

Taken as a whole, Morgan’s paper is a rigorous, incisive, and ultimately hopeful intervention in the study of martial arts culture. Her fusion of Nietzschean critique, Schelerian sociology, and Tomellerian ethics offers a valuable theoretical framework for both scholars and practitioners. It also opens multiple pathways for further research. Ethnographic studies could explore how ressentiment operates in different martial subcultures—traditionalist, sportive, or commercial. Pedagogical work might examine how martial educators can cultivate fraternity in their dojos, turning envy into empathy and rivalry into research.

Morgan’s real gift here is to show that martial arts are not just about dominance, lineage, or even self-defence. They are about ethics, power, and meaning. And if we are willing to do the hard internal work, they might also be about transformation. As martial artists and scholars, we are not merely keepers of style or tradition—we are stewards of the culture we create through our interactions.

日本語概要：「武道、宗教、ルサンチマン ― カイ・モーガンによる理論的考察」カイ・モーガンの論文「武道、宗教、ルサンチマン」（2020年）は、武道界における流派間の対立や嫉妬、軽蔑の感情を、ニーチェやシェーラー、そしてトメッレリの哲学的概念「ルサンチマン」を用いて分析する、鋭い理論的アプローチです。
モーガンは、他流派への否定的な態度が、しばしば「道徳的優位性」を装った嫉妬や不安から生まれると主張します。たとえば、成功している道場を「マクドージョ」と軽蔑する態度には、しばしば自己の劣等感の裏返しが見られます。
このような価値の転倒をニーチェは批判しましたが、シェーラーは近代社会の不平等こそがルサンチマンの原因であると反論します。モーガンはこの議論を道場という「ミニ社会」に適用し、階層構造と現実の不一致が感情の歪みを生むと述べています。
一方、トメッレリの現代的な視点はより希望に満ちています。彼はルサンチマンを自己変容へのきっかけと捉え、「共に脆さを分かち合う」フラタニティ（兄弟愛）へと昇華する可能性を示唆します。武道の稽古がまさにそのような実践的・共同的探究の場であるという提案は、実践者にとっても研究者にとっても大きな示唆を与えます。
この論文は、武道を「単なる技術」ではなく、「倫理的・社会的探究の場」として再考させる重要な貢献であり、今後の研究にも応用可能な理論的枠組みを提示しています。

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